



**UNSW**  
CANBERRA

Australia's  
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University

# Howard Government Retrospective III

"Trials and Tribulations: 2001-2004"

Provisional (Old) Parliament House  
4-5 December 2018



PUBLIC LEADERSHIP  
RESEARCH GROUP



Conference Broadcast Partner:



## The Howard Government Retrospective Conference Series

The Liberal-National Party Coalition was elected to office on 2 March 1996 and continued in power until 24 November 2007. UNSW Canberra is holding a series of retrospective conferences to assess the performance of the four Howard Governments. Each event provides the basis for collections of essays contributed by principal participants, key public servants, leading commentators and notable scholars drawing on documents in the John Howard Collection held at the Defence Force Academy Library. The intention is for this series to become the 'standard' treatment of the Howard years.



Contributors have been asked to focus critically on the Coalition's policies and performance to reveal the Government's shortcomings and failures. This commitment to a candid critique will attract the attention of the press and current-serving politicians, guaranteeing the volumes a substantial public profile at the time of their release. UNSW Press is the series publisher.

The first conference and volume covered the 1996 election, the Coalition's readiness for office, the main policy decisions and practical challenges of the first year of the Howard Government, including gun control and ministerial responsibility.

The second conference and volume dealt with the second and third years of the Coalition's first term in office (1997-98) and most of its second term (1998-2001). Volume II includes coverage of Wik and native title, the Patricks waterfront dispute, the constitutional convention, the Coalition's near defeat at the 1998 poll, the Government's response to post-independence violence in East Timor, and the introduction of the GST. The narrative ended in mid-2001, at the time of the Aston by-election, just before the collapse of Ansett Airlines, the '9/11' terrorist attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan.

This third conference focuses on the controversial events leading to the 2001 election including the MV *Tampa* Crisis, the collapse of Ansett Airlines, the '9/11' terrorist attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan. It looks at the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the outbreak of the 'history wars', managing the environment and health care, the challenges faced by the Labor Opposition and the rise of Mark Latham.

The final volume is concerned with the period from October 2004 to November 2007 and will focus on Work Choices, Indigenous Reconciliation, the Northern Territory intervention and the election that saw the Coalition lose office and the Prime Minister his seat in parliament.

### Working Volume Titles

- I The Ascent to Power, 1996: The Howard Government, Volume 1
- II Back from the Brink, 1997-2001: The Howard Government, Volume 2
- III Trials and Transformations, 2001-2004: The Howard Government, Volume 3
- IV The Desire for Change, 2004 – 2007: The Howard Government, Volume 4

## Conference Welcome

### Professor Tom Frame

Director, Public Leadership Research Group



UNSW Canberra is delighted to welcome you to the third of four Howard Government Retrospective Conferences. For those who have travelled some distance to participate we are grateful that you have made the journey. We also extend a hand of friendship to those making contact with UNSW Canberra for the first time and hope you will take the time to become familiar with the full range of the University's activities in the National Capital. The conference is hosted by the University's newly created Public Leadership Research Group (PLRG). Let me explain the origins and the remit of the PLRG.

### Universities and leadership studies

There are few areas of human endeavour that have aroused more intellectual interest but produced less academic clarity than leadership. Scholars with very different experiences and expertise, such as behavioural scientists and analytical philosophers, have turned the explanatory power of their disciplines on the exercise of leadership in the search for clear and compelling definitions and to identify the essence of effective leadership. The existence of many competing accounts of leading and the proliferation of contrasting leadership theories reveals the highly complex and incredibly nuanced nature of the subject. Some writers have focussed on leaders and others on followers; some have concentrated on abiding principles and

others on changing contexts. Consequently, the leadership training regimes offered by business schools are very different to the leadership education programs promoted by humanities departments. There is, however, general agreement on what constitutes a bad leader and poor leadership. If nothing else, scholars have contributed a 'don't' list for leadership even if the 'do' list is much shorter by comparison.

### Why leadership?

UNSW aspires to be a leader within the higher educational sector and in the Australian community. Since its foundation in 1949 with a focus on science and technology for those pursuing professional careers, UNSW has expanded its programs and enhanced its reputation to become one of only three Australian universities ranked in the world's Top 50. The University's evolution has relied on firm leadership during critical moments when courage was needed to embrace new opportunities and when indecisiveness might have imperilled long-term investment. Leadership remains a key component of UNSW's future development. The 2025 Strategy highlights the pivotal role of leaders, leading and leadership in UNSW's teaching, research and engagement. The University does not want to be a follower, merely replicating initiatives and rebadging programs that others have devised and delivered. UNSW wants to move in new directions in tackling the persistent problems and perennial challenges facing individuals and institutions. This requires a strong culture of personal and professional leadership.

### Why UNSW?

The UNSW 2025 Strategy explains that 'a great university ... is a global leader in discovery, innovation, impact, education and thought leadership'. Hence, leadership and the enabling of leaders is the focus of the strategy. The University aspires to be 'a leader in addressing the grand challenges facing society' becoming a 'primary point of reference for leaders and policy makers'. The strategy emphasises that UNSW 'will be a leader in talent and organisational development' and will 'tackle real-world problems, leading debate and policy formulation' while being 'Australia's leading university for international education'. The University will 'identify and develop high performing individuals as our future leaders' and promote 'top talent programs for researchers, teachers, administrators, managers and leaders' with investment in 'HR capability to better support leaders'.



As UNSW seeks to be a national leader it is conscious of the nation's continuing need for leadership at levels and in all sectors. Hence, the need for fresh ideas and new initiatives in the education and training of leaders. UNSW Canberra has been working with Defence since 1967 and has been closely concerned with leadership since then. UNSW has partnered with Defence – both the ADF and the APS – to focus on aspects of leadership. Located in the national capital – the home of many national institutions – UNSW Canberra is ideally placed to make the most of its existing relationship with a number of public and private organisations.

### To what end?

The PLRG reflects the commitment of UNSW as a public university to serve the public interest. The PLRG has three foundational objectives:

- i) foster the study of the principles and practice of public leadership;
- ii) focus attention on defining and describing the public interest; and
- iii) explore the 'contest of ideas' and 'thought leadership' to public policy.

The PLRG also contains the Howard Library which consists of the John Howard Collection, the Howard Government Collection, and exhibition-display items drawn from the period 1996-2007 that depict Australia's national life. The records being acquired by the Howard Library are intended to make it a critical resource for public leadership studies.

The Research Group's activities are shaped by three broad questions. First, what is public leadership and how is its practice enhanced? Second, how can UNSW promote public leadership through teaching and research? Third, where can UNSW Canberra enhance the practice of public leadership principles within the Defence community? PLRG programs will enhance leadership practice through reflection on student leadership capacities; assessment of student leadership abilities; analysis of leadership requirements in the workplace/organisation; assessment of senior leadership team performance in the workplace/organisation; building an organisational culture welcoming of leadership, governance and leadership; discerning the difference between leadership and management; and, building a team, imparting a vision and leadership succession.

The PLRG is not aligned with any political party, think tank or government instrumentality. It does not receive funding from any political party or lobby group. It affirms the apolitical nature of the University and its commitment to independent and critical scholarship. Hence, the aim of this conference is to be critical rather than celebratory (although giving praise where it is due) – to create an atmosphere of open and balanced inquiry – including among those who contributed to the history we are assessing for their candid judgment – making the most of the passage of time. The University is honoured to be providing a context for such inquiry and we look forward to your contributions.



# Howard Government Retrospective III "Trials and Tribulations: 2001-2004"

## Conference Program

### Day 1 - Tuesday 4 December


Time	Event	Speaker
1100	Official opening of the Howard Library	
1330	Welcome	Professor Michael Frater FTSE
1335	The Third Howard Government: setting the scene	Professor Tom Frame

### Session 1 - The political mood and public opinion

1355	Hitching a ride in MV Tampa	Em. Professor Murray Goot
1430	The Challenge of Opposition	The Hon. Simon Crean
1505	Afternoon Tea	

### Session 2 - Interacting with a changing world

1520	Immigration and public opinion	Hon. Councillor Philip Ruddock
1610	Trade and Transport in the post-Ansett FTA era	The Hon. Mark Vaile AO
1650	Refreshments	
1715	Book Launch Back from the Brink, Howard Government, Vol. 2, 1997-2001	Em. Professor Fred Hilmer AO



## Day 2 - Wednesday 5 December

Time	Event	Speaker
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### Session 3 - MV Tampa

0905	A commander's perspective A uniformed legal perspective A journalist's perspective	Commodore Bob Morrison CSC Commodore Mike Smith AM Steve Lewis
1020	Morning Tea	

### Session 4 - Conflict and Controversy

1040	Afghanistan – an exit strategy for the war without end	Professor William Maley
1115	Iraq and the politics of alliance relationships	Dr Albert Palazzo

### Session 5 - The Polemics of the Past

1150	Discovering Democracy or Shaping Society: The Howard Government and the History Wars	Dr Zareh Ghazarian
1220	National Identity as a political tool	Dr Kim Murray
1250	Lunch	

### Session 6 - Managing the Unexpected

1330	'Children overboard', the AWB and the conduct of public inquiries	Dr Scott Prasser
1410	The Latham Factor	Professor Frank Bongiorno
1445	Afternoon tea	

### Session 7 - Portfolio matters

1500	Economic Growth and Environmental Protection	Professor Aynsley Kellow
1540	Health care and the freedom of choice	A/Professor James Gillespie

### Session 8 - Closing Reflections

1620	'Soberly, Wisely and Sensibly': Controlling the Senate	Hon. John Howard OM, AC
1645	Concluding remarks: the Fourth Howard Government	Professor Tom Frame

## Howard Government Retrospective III: 2001 - 2004

### Bios

#### Andrew Blyth

Andrew Blyth is a senior member of staff at UNSW Canberra. More recently, Andrew was the former CEO of the ACT & Region Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a former Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser in the Howard Government. He holds an undergraduate degree in Government and postgraduate qualifications in Business and International Relations. In 2012 he was awarded a Fulbright Professional Scholarship in Australia-US Alliance Studies that he used to conduct research at the University of Texas at Austin into off-grid energy solutions. He is a contributing author to *The Long Road: Australia's Train, Advise and Assist Missions* (UNSW Press, 2017); *The Ascent to Power, 1996: The Howard Government, Volume 1* (UNSW Press, 2017) and *Back from the Brink, 1997-2001: The Howard Government, Volume II* (UNSW Press, 2018). Andrew is currently researching leadership education and training of new entry officer cadets and midshipmen at the Defence Academy through a professional doctorate. Andrew has been admitted as a Graduate of the Australian Institute of Company Directors.

#### Frank Bongiorno

Frank Bongiorno is Professor of History at the Australian National University and Head of the School of History in the Research School of Social Sciences. He has previously held posts at Griffith University, the University of New England and King's College London. In 1997-98, he was Smuts Visiting Fellow in Commonwealth Studies at the University of Cambridge. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and is the author or co-author of two books on the Labor Party in Australia. He has published on various aspects of Australian history, including politics, sexuality and religion. His most recent book is *The Eighties: The Decade That Transformed Australia* (2015).

#### Annette Carter

Annette Carter is the Administrative Assistant of the Public Leadership Research Group. She studied a Bachelor of Arts with Honours while working at the Australian National University transcribing 19th century births, deaths and marriage records from Tasmania. When that project ended in 2006, she worked in the Research Centre of the Australian War Memorial. In 2009 she moved to London to work on a project to catalogue all the war memorials in the United Kingdom at the Imperial War Museum and undertake an internship at the Victoria and Albert Museum before returning, in 2010, to work at the Australian War Memorial. In 2011 she went back to work at the Imperial War Museum and completed a Master of Science in Museum Studies before becoming the Curator of a 17th century Town Hall in rural England.

#### The Honourable Simon Crean

Simon Crean was a Cabinet Minister in the Hawke, Keating, Rudd and Gillard governments, holding portfolios in the areas of science and technology, primary industry and energy, employment, education and training and trade. He was Leader of the Opposition from 2001-2003 and former Deputy Leader of the Opposition from 1998-2001. He served as federal member for Hotham (1990-2013). Prior to being elected to the House of Representatives he was President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions from 1985-1990. Crean is a graduate of Monash University. He is currently chair of the Australian Livestock Exporters' Council, director of the Museum of Australian Democracy at Old Parliament House, deputy chair of the European Australian Business Council, member of the Monash University Council, and a member of the Linfox Board.

#### Dr Rhonda Evans

Rhonda Evans directs the Edward A. Clark Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies at the University of Texas at Austin and is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government. She was previously an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at East Carolina University. Rhonda holds a Ph.D. in Government from UT-Austin, a J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh, and a B.A. in Political Science from Kent State University's Honors College, graduating *phi beta kappa*. During her legal career, she served as an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney in the State of Ohio. Rhonda is a principal investigator for the Australian and New Zealand Policy Agendas Projects. Her research appears in the *Journal of Democracy*, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, *Osgoode Hall Law Review*, and *Journal of Common Market Studies*, among other outlets. She co-authored *Legislating Equality* with Oxford University Press.



## Professor Tom Frame

Tom Frame joined the RAN College as a cadet midshipman in 1979 and served in the Navy for fifteen years. He has been a Visiting Fellow in the School of Astronomy and Astrophysics at ANU; Patron of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia; a Councillor of the Australian War Memorial and judged the inaugural Prime Minister's Prize for Australian History (2007). He is presently the Director of the Public Leadership Research Group and the Howard Library at UNSW Canberra and is the author or editor of over 40 books including *The Life and Death of Harold Holt* and *Moral Injury: Unseen Wounds in an Age of Barbarism*.

## Dr Zareh Ghazarian


Zareh Ghazarian is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University. He is a leading commentator on politics and government and regularly contributes to the political debate by appearing on national and international media. He has published widely in academic journals and his teaching and research interests include political parties, elections and public policy. He was a Fellow in the Prime Ministers Centre at the Museum of Australian Democracy at Old Parliament House in 2015-16. His latest book is *The Making of a Party System: Minor Parties in the Australian Senate* (2015, Monash University Publishing).

## Associate Professor James Gillespie

James Gillespie is the Deputy Director, Menzies Centre for Health Policy and Associate Professor in Health Policy and Sub Dean for Higher Degree Research in the School of Public Health, University of Sydney, Australia. His research interests focus on the policy implications of the growing burden of chronic illness. He is a lead investigator on an evaluation of Partners in Recovery, a national mental health care integration project. He is the author of *Making Medicare: the Politics of Universal Health Care in Australia* (UNSW Press 2013). His work on the history of international health has focused on relations between institutions, national and international politics. He has published on the development of international agencies and health programs. He is currently working on the historical antecedents of universal health coverage as a global objective.

## Professor Murray Goot

Murray Goot FASSA is an Emeritus Professor in the Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University. His most recent book is *The Conscription Conflict and the Great War* (2016), co-edited with Robin Archer, Joy Damousi and Sean Scalmer. He contributed to the first two volumes on *The Howard Government*, and is currently exploring the history of political campaigning in Australia and the history of opinion polling in Australia, Britain and the United States.



## The Honourable John Howard OM, AC

John Howard was the twenty-fifth Prime Minister of Australia, leading the nation from March 1996 to December 2007. He was the federal member for Bennelong in the House of Representatives (1974-2007) and filled several ministerial and shadow ministerial posts prior to 1996. He was made a companion of the Order of Australia (AC) and a member of the Order of Merit (OM) in 2012. He is the second-longest serving prime minister of Australia.

## Professor Aynsley Kellow

Aynsley Kellow, a graduate of the University of Otago, is Professor Emeritus of Government. He retired from the University of Tasmania at the end of 2017, having taught previously at Griffith University (as Professor of Social Sciences in the Australian School of Environmental Studies) and Deakin University. He has interests in public policy, especially energy and environmental policy. He is a former president of the Australian Political Science Association and former Chair of Research Committee 38 on Politics and Business of the International Political Science Association, and his recent interests centre on the multi-arena, multi-level nature of the international policy process, including the representation of interests within it. He is the editor or author of several books, including two on the OECD (with Peter Carroll). In 2018 he published *Negotiating Climate Change: A Forensic Analysis and Handbook on Research on NGOs* (edited with Hannah Murphy-Gregory).

## Steve Lewis

As a leading figure in the Canberra press gallery, Steve has built an extensive network across the political landscape and within the federal public service. As a senior adviser with Newgate, Steve consults to some of Australia's leading corporations, providing advice about federal government relations and media engagement. He also provides high-level strategic advice to several Federal Government agencies. Steve is Senior Vice President of the National Press Club and regularly hosts their nationally televised lunches. He is co-author of the best-selling political novels *The Marmalade Files*, *The Mandarin Code* and *The Shadow Game*, which inspired the global TV smash hit 'Secret City'. Steve was also instrumental in establishing the Press Gallery Midwinter Ball, which has raised nearly \$4 million for charity.

## Professor William Maley

William Maley is Professor of Diplomacy at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, where he served as Foundation Director from 1 July 2003 to 31 December 2014. He taught for many years in the School of Politics, University College, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, and has served as a Visiting Professor at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, and a Visiting Research Fellow in the Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University. He is a Barrister of the High Court of Australia, Vice-President of the Refugee Council of Australia, and a member of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the journal *Global Responsibility to Protect*, and of the International Advisory Board of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University. In 2002, he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia (AM). In 2009, he was elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (FASSA).

## Commodore Robert Morrison CSC RANR

Robert (Bob) Morrison served in the Royal Australian Navy for 39 years, a period which included commanding the amphibious warship, HMAS *Manoora*, on operational tours to the Solomon Islands and to the North Arabian Gulf following 9/11. He commanded *Manoora* during the MV Tampa crisis near Christmas Island in 2001, and through the transportation of Afghani and Iraqi asylum seekers to Nauru. He has also commanded the naval air station, HMAS *Albatross*, and in 2011 deployed on operations to Afghanistan as the ADF representative and Special Assistant to the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission. His final appointment prior to leaving the ADF was with the implementation team for the 2015 *First Principles Review* reform program for the Department of Defence.

## Dr Kim Murray

Kim Murray worked on the staff of Coalition Senators and Ministers, and with the Minister for Defence in the Howard Government from 1996. At Adelaide University she gained a BA (Hons) in English (2003), winning a university prize for Australian Literary Studies, and a PhD in Politics (2010) entitled, *John Howard: A Study*

*in Policy Consistency.* At the 2006 Howard Decade Conference in Canberra, she presented a paper, *John Howard's policies: formed over a lifetime, so why were we surprised?* From 2004 she has tutored in Australian and International Politics and was Guest Lecturer in Comparative Politics in Leadership.

## Dr Albert Palazzo

Al Palazzo is the Director of War Studies in the Australian Army Research Centre. His Ph.D. is from The Ohio State University where he studied with Professors Allan Millett and Williamson Murray. His thesis was published as *Seeking Victory on The Western Front: The British Army & Chemical Warfare in World War I*. He has published widely on the history of the Australian Army and the contemporary character of war. His major works include *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901-2001*; *Moltke to bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in Contemporary Military Environment*; *The Australian Army in Vietnam*; *The Future of War Debate in Australia*; and, *Forging Australian Land Power, A Primer*. His current research is on the effect of resource limits and climate change on the future of war and multi-domain operations.

## Dr Scott Prasser

Scott Prasser has held senior policy and advisory roles across a variety of portfolios in state and federal governments in both public service and ministerial offices. Scott has also served in academic positions across five universities in four states and territories teaching in government, public policy and business courses. He gained his Bachelor of Arts and Master of Public Administration degrees from the University of Queensland and his doctorate from Griffith University. Scott's recent publications include: *Audit Commissions: Reviewing the Reviewers*, (with K. Jones, 2013) and *Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries: Practice and Potential*, (co-edited with Helen Tracey, 2014).

## The Honourable Clr Philip Ruddock

The Honourable Philip Ruddock is the second longest serving Federal parliamentarian in Australian history and the first born in Canberra. Elected in 1973 and retiring in 2016, his parliamentary service spanned 42 years. Only Billy Hughes served longer from 1901-52. The son of a New South Wales Liberal state parliamentarian, Ruddock was raised in the Hills district of Sydney and studied law at the University of Sydney. After securing preselection at his first attempt in 1973, he represented the electorates of Parramatta (1973-77), Dundas (1977-93) and Berowra (1993-2016). He served in several shadow portfolios before he became Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs in 1996. He was appointed Attorney General in 2003 and remained in this post until the Coalition's election defeat in 2007. Ruddock has been a Special Envoy for Human Rights from 2016 and was elected Mayor of Hornsby Shire in 2017 – a post once held by his father.

## Dr Michael F Smith AM, Barrister at Law, NSW Bar, Commodore RANR

Michael is from Broken Hill, far western NSW. He grew up in Geelong, Victoria. Michael attended Melbourne University, graduating in Arts and Law. He holds post graduate degrees in international law from Sydney University and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Michael was admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor in Victoria in 1976. He then joined the RAN as a legal officer. He has served in a broad range of legal and staff appointments, including as Staff Officer to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Chief Staff Officer to the Chief of Navy, Commanding Officer RAN Naval College, and Director General of the Defence Legal Service. It was in this latter role that he was a legal advisor to Government during the Tampa matter. Since transferring to the active Navy Reserve in 2005, Michael has served in general bar practice in Tasmania, and been a Visiting Fellow at the ANU College of Law. His current professional interests include the use of enhanced maritime pursuit capabilities in the Pacific region, and the development of rules-based norms in the Indo Pacific.

## The Honourable Mark Vaile AO

Mark Vaile was Leader of The Nationals and Deputy Prime Minister of Australia from July 2005 to December 2007. He was the federal member for Lyne (1993-2007). He held several ministerial portfolios throughout his time in Parliament, including transport, agriculture, trade and regional services. He was appointed an Officer (AO) in the General Division of the Order of Australia in 2012. After leaving the Federal Parliament in 2008, Mark has embarked on a career in the private sector and is currently chairman or director of several ASX listed companies.

# Howard Government Retrospective III: 2001-2004

## A Bibliographic Survey

compiled by Trish Burgess

Research Assistant, UNSW Canberra Howard Library

This survey covers the major commentaries of the Howard Government published between 2001 and 2004 – the period encompassed by this conference.

### 2001

Donald Horne, *Looking for leadership: Australia in the Howard years*, Melbourne: Penguin.

A response to the lack of vision displayed by the current government's leadership; Horne makes a number of salient points about the concept of vision as coming as much from words as from legislation. He takes an anecdotal view of the changes in Australia, revisiting the streets of his childhood. "In his path-breaking *The Lucky Country*, Donald Horne wrote a text for the times as they seemed in the age of Robert Gordon Menzies. In *Looking For Leadership* he writes of the distractions and quandaries of ordinary Australians at a time when political leadership has drifted away to languish in what he calls 'John Howard's Dreamtime'. In a unique presentation of Australians as a people of great potential waiting to resume their history, Horne gives a masterly picture of a prime minister lost in events in a society rich in possibilities". (Back cover)

Richard Leaver, 'The Meanings, Origins and Implications of "the Howard Doctrine"', *The Pacific Review*, vol. 14, 2001, Issue 1.

This article examines the background to the so-called 'Howard Doctrine' of 1999 in response to the problems that Australian diplomacy and defence policy encountered during the East Timor crisis. The article begins by examining the critical reaction both in Australia and abroad to the doctrine which appeared to imply Australia's increased reliance on the 'special relationship' with the US and its role as a 'deputy' of its ANZUS partner in the East Asia region. The article then demonstrates the historical origins of the doctrine's thinking in Australia's reliance since the post-war period on a system of serial bilateralism and special relationships with first the UK, the US and then Indonesia. However, the article also points out the essential vulnerabilities inherent in this type of serial bilateralism and its relative inability to respond effectively to the East Timor crisis. Finally, the article considers the systemic risk in Australian policy as manifested in the doctrine, and the future viability of serial bilateralism in dealing with Australia's regional diplomatic and security agenda. (Publisher's website)

Robert Manne (ed.), *The Barren Years: John Howard and Australian political culture*, Melbourne: Text Publishing.

Manne describes a period in which we have lost opportunity after opportunity. Hopes for the republic and

Aboriginal reconciliation are fading. The universities and the ABC are under siege. And refugees are incarcerated in prison-style camps. Manne shows how social divisions run deep and analyses the One Nation phenomenon's refusal.

Guy Rundle, 'The Opportunist: John Howard and the Triumph of Reaction', *Quarterly Essay*, vol. 3, 2001, pp. 1-65.

In *The Opportunist*, Guy Rundle comes to grips with John Howard, the prime minister who, on the eve of an election, seems to have turned round his political fortunes by spurning refugees and writing blank cheques for America's War on Terror. This is a brilliant account of John Howard's dominant ideas, his concerted 'dreaming' with its emphasis on unity and national identity that reveals him to be the most reactionary PM we have ever had, the only political leader who would allow ideas like those of One Nation to dominate the mainstream of Australian politics in order to improve his political chances. Rundle puts Howard in the context of the economic liberalism he shares with his colleagues and opponents and the conservative social ideology that sets him apart. It is a complex portrait in a radical mirror which relates John Howard to everything from Menzies's 'forgotten people' to the inadvertent glamour of the government's antidrug advertising. It is also a plea for right-thinking people of every political persuasion to resist the call to prejudice and reaction. (Cover)

Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

In the last decade of the 20th century, racial issues became very prominent in Australian public life, moving from fringe to centre stage. This text seeks to explain this change and to make sense of this issue's increasingly disturbing profile. (Cover)

### 2002

David Clune, 'Back to the future?: the November 2001 Federal election', *Australasian Parliamentary Review*, vol.17, no.1 pp.3-16

Until August 2001 most observers thought that John Howard's Liberal-National Party Coalition Government was heading for defeat at national elections likely to be held at the end of the year. In the event his government retained office with the largest swing to an incumbent since the 1966 elections. (Publisher's website)

David Solomon (ed.), *Howard's Race Winning the Unwinnable Election*, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers.

How and why John Howard won the extraordinary 2001 federal election is the subject of this in-depth



examination by six of Australia's leading journalists. They detail the way political fortunes swung wildly from one party to the other throughout the year, and the impact of the crucial arrival of the *Tampa* off Christmas Island. (Book cover)

## 2003

Raimond Gaita (ed.), *Why the War was Wrong*, Melbourne: Text Publishing

In *Why the War was Wrong* leading Australian writers give their answers. Arguing from legal, political, historical, philosophical and humanitarian standpoints, they make a passionate case for the primacy of our responsibilities to our fellow human beings. (Book cover)

David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin

*Dark Victory* is the secret history of John Howard's campaign against boat people that began with Tampa and ended ten extraordinary weeks later – after deaths and disappearances, violent confrontations in the Indian Ocean and international uproar – with the Australian people giving the Prime Minister his third, most daring election victory. (Book cover)

Frank Brennan, *Tampering with Asylum A Universal Humanitarian Problem*, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press

Frank Brennan argues that the Australian government's response is a massive overreaction, possible only because Australia is a remote country with few asylum seekers and no land borders. Brennan shows that Australia has set up a virtual offshore border, denying asylum seekers any access to legal protection. (Book cover)

## 2004

Garran, Robert, *True believer: John Howard, George Bush, and the American alliance*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

When John Howard stood in a press conference at Washington's Willard Hotel just after the planes crashed into the Twin Towers on September 11, he knew exactly what to do: Australia would quickly pledge support for its great and powerful friend ... In *True Believer*, Robert Garran examines Howard's unswerving belief in the radical and dangerous doctrines of George W Bush. Garran argues that in his eagerness to join Bush in his war in Iraq, Howard failed to comprehend the perils. More than that, Howard has hijacked Australia's national story with his conservative nationalism, and is now using that story to take Australia on a dangerous journey ... With debate on the US alliance set to continue and with many Australians seeking a strong alternative to Howard's risky position, *True Believer* is both timely and thought-provoking." (Book cover)

Margo Kingston, *Not Happy, John! Defending our democracy*, Melbourne: Penguin Books

Margo Kingston, one of Australia's most fearless political journalists, thinks its crunch time for Australia. *Not Happy, John!* is a gusty, anecdotal book with a deadly serious purpose: to lay bare the insidious ways in which John Howard's government has profoundly undermined our freedoms and our rights. (Book cover)

Robert Manne (ed.), *The Howard Years*, Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda

This powerful book examines the record of the Howard government. In a series of engaging and accessible essays by some of our leading thinkers, it critically assesses how the government has performed on key issues and tracks its larger influence on Australian society. It shows how the 'most conservative leader the Liberal Party has ever had' has re-made, and divided, the nation. (Book cover)





# The *MV Tampa* Incident: A Participant's Perspective

Commodore Mike Deeks CSC RAN Rtd

## Introduction

In August 2001, I was the commanding officer of the Navy's underway replenishment ship HMAS *Success* and was nearing the end of my period in command. As I had been promoted to the rank of Commodore ahead of my next posting, I naturally thought my command had been successful although not without incident. The ship had conducted two deployments to North Asia. On both occasions we had lawfully passed through the Taiwan Straits but were closely harassed by a Chinese PLA(N) destroyer. The first transits happened not long after a United States maritime patrol aircraft was forced down on Hainan Island and the plane and crew held for six weeks. There was heightened tension between the Chinese and a number of Western nations including Australia.

Notwithstanding continuous communication with Maritime Headquarters (located in Sydney) and the additional support that was made available by the headquarters' staff as we passed through the straits, these incidents persuaded me that it is only the local commander who has the complete picture and, therefore, a firm grasp of the practical nuances associated with any evolving situation. These experiences certainly prompted me to refresh my understanding of international maritime law.

Some months later in Australian waters, we suffered the ignominy of a minor collision with the frigate HMAS *Arunta*. The frigate experienced a total power failure during an underway replenishment activity. Despite the ship's companies of both vessels responding quickly, *Arunta* lost both steerage and propulsion and clipped *Success* as she dropped astern. There was no serious damage and no casualties. *Success* continued scheduled operations. It provided a good lesson, however, of the hazardous and unpredictable nature of naval operations and manoeuvring ships in tight formation. After a long period at sea, *Success* was slipped in the Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island in Sydney and entered refit for repairs and maintenance. I was due to hand over command in a matter of weeks.

## Late 2001

As the ship was refitting, many of the ship's company (me included) removed their spare uniforms and personal gear. We were busy dealing with the plethora of issues that routinely confront a ship in this situation: leave and postings, education and training; medicals and personal administration as well as the many maintenance issues being addressed in collaboration with commercial contractors and dockyard staff.

At 2pm on Wednesday 29 August 2001, I received a call from the operations staff in Maritime Headquarters located adjacent to the dockyard. I was asked: 'what crew do you think you would need to man and operate a large merchant vessel?' I started to respond with my initial thoughts when I was interrupted quite forcefully. 'Get together with your HODs [Heads of Department], figure out what you would need, and have that crew

mustered at the gangway in 25 minutes where there will be a bus waiting for you. You will be taken to Richmond Air Force base where you will board a Hercules C130 aircraft for Christmas Island. More information to follow. You are not to tell your ship's company anything at this stage, other than that the selected crew may be away for a couple of weeks'.

A quick conference with my HODs identified a total of 25 positions that we would need to fill to safely and effectively man a merchant vessel for which we had no details of configuration or operating profile. The next challenge was determining whether personnel suitable to fill these roles were actually available and in *Success* at that moment. Despite short notice and the uncertainty of both the nature and duration of the operation, we selected an all-volunteer group. We gathered dockside and were conveyed to Richmond. I remember the bus trip very clearly. Everyone in the contingent was telephoning their families and letting them know they would not be home for a while. I was again impressed by the resilience and adaptability of naval members and their families. Not everyone was happy about the circumstances. Nevertheless, no one shirked their responsibility and no one complained.

Shortly afterwards we were airborne on the long flight across the country, stopping at the Learmonth Airbase to refuel and to pick up some additional personnel from Perth. The enlarged party arrived at Christmas Island late that evening. We had been instructed to join a Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) team that were already on the ground, using the local gymnasium as their temporary headquarters. We were further instructed that our presence on the Island was not to be disclosed to anyone and especially not the growing media scrum. While the events surrounding the arrival of *MV Tampa* off Christmas Island were creating considerable interest among the Australian and global media, the small number of flights to and from Christmas Island meant that the media presence was initially small.

The need to remain unnoticed presented an immediate problem in that we were still dressed in the uniforms we had worn to work that morning. On an island with only 1800 residents, new people inevitably stand out. New people in uniform were even more conspicuous. Very few in the naval contingent had any form of civilian clothing as our lockers had been cleared out before the refit. Fortunately, the airport was largely deserted when we arrived. We slipped onto Christmas Island unnoticed and were forced to lay low until further notice.

The next morning a decision was made to relocate my team and the SASR contingent to the derelict former Administrator's Residence on Smith Point at the southern side of Flying Fish Cove. The deserted house offered a greater level of security and was away from the public eye. It was in a very poor state of repair after years of disuse but the soldiers and sailors managed to make the building operational and liveable. The SASR relocated their extensive array of communications and command support equipment. The sailors cleaned and repaired

the kitchen which they renamed 'The Galley' while the bathrooms were called the 'Heads and Showers'.

Despite their initial reluctance to eat Navy food, the soldiers soon appreciated the hot meals the navy chefs prepared, especially the freshly cooked bacon. These meals were an attractive alternative to the ration packs they had been subsisting on since arriving on Christmas Island. One of my team was despatched to the local shop to purchase all the civilian clothing available. He returned with an array of gaudy tourist t-shirts and board shorts. Thongs were the only footwear he could buy. Hoping to be less conspicuous, we were certainly colourful.

## Context

When we arrived on Christmas Island, MV *Tampa* was already at anchor about 4 nautical miles offshore. The ship was well inside the territorial waters with the 438 refugees camped on the deck. Some makeshift screens had rigged to provide them some level of protection from the elements. The SASR contingent commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) 'Gus' Gilmore had visited the ship and with some of his contingent remaining onboard. My team were on stand-by in the event that the Australian Government decided to commandeer *Tampa*. We would sail the ship and the embarked asylum seekers to the *Tampa's* original destination – Singapore.

In anticipation, the SASR personnel managed to secure drawings of the *Tampa's* layout and systems so we could prepare for whatever might lie ahead. If we were ordered to take over the ship, I did not think we would receive any active assistance from the *Tampa's* crew. They were more likely to assist in protecting their ship from the inadvertent damage we might cause by our ignorance of the ship's operating systems. Until proven otherwise, we had to assume that we would be on our own. We studied the drawings and schematics intently and quizzed the troops who had been onboard about the layout of the key spaces and the crew's demeanour.

I am not alone in believing the Howard Government was confronted with a difficult and demanding situation as the Cabinet considered a range of options in resolving what had now become an international crisis. One thing was clear, however. The Government was not going to let the asylum seekers come ashore in Australia. As events unfolded, I was not familiar with everything that was happening. From what I could discern, the SASR personnel were doing their best to keep a very tense situation under control. Their efforts included producing posters and leaflets with graphics and images (and in the languages of the refugees) explaining to them what was occurring, what the Australian government's position was and what options the refugees had. The SAS and my team were attempting to anticipate and prepare for a range of possible contingencies that were dependent on government decisions. That a vast majority of these contingencies would not eventuate did not allow us to discount them. Lieutenant Colonel Gilmore appeared as a witness in High Court proceedings in Melbourne giving sworn evidence while retaining operational command on Christmas Island. This was a very unusual occurrence

that few operational commanders have ever experienced. It demonstrated the complexity of the situation and the rapidly changing circumstances as the scenario developed.

When HMAS *Manoora* arrived off Christmas Island, I joined the leaders of the SASR contingent for briefings and planning sessions. By this stage, the Government's intentions were becoming clearer. We were instructed to plan for the transfer of the refugees from *Tampa* to *Manoora*. What was not clear was the Australian ship's destination. We were not told where the refugees would be disembarked. The eventual outcome is well known. *Manoora* departed Christmas Island with all the asylum seekers embarked and, after negotiations between the governments of Australia and Nauru, they were transported to Nauru for offshore processing in what became known as the 'Pacific Solution'. After a week on Christmas Island supporting the SASR contingent and acting as the on-scene liaison between *Manoora* and the SASR, we returned to Sydney. No-one on the Island, other than the Army personnel, were ever aware of our presence.

## Conclusions

The *Tampa* incident was a test of the Government and challenge for the Australian Defence Force. There was no manual on how to deal with an event of this kind. All parties to the crisis acted with the best intentions but each had a different perspective and different objectives. John Howard and his Government took decisive and dramatic action that dealt effectively with the immediate crisis. It also laid the foundations of policy and subsequent legislation that saw the cessation of illegal boat arrivals. Others can comment on the political implications of the Government's handling of this situation and its impact on the looming election.

In terms of the ADF's role, some have depicted the involvement of uniformed men and women, and particularly the Navy's role, as one of reluctant participation in the interception and management of Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEVs). From my observations, it is impossible to generalise about individual sentiments within the Navy. The *Tampa* incident and the SIEV interceptions that followed were characterised, from a uniformed perspective, as a disagreeable but necessary activity giving practical expression to the Government's border protection policy.

The men and women of the ADF are often called upon to undertake challenging and, at times, unpalatable tasks. Significantly, as a disciplined force that responds to Government direction within the law, these directions are not questioned. In hindsight, I am deeply relieved that I was not required to take command of *Tampa*. If I had been called upon to board the ship and exercise command, and if I believed the direction to do so was lawful, I would have carried out the order without question. If it were subsequently determined that the action was illegal, I would have dealt with that situation as it unfolded. I would have relied on the fact that I had acted appropriately with the information I had available to me at the time. I could do no other.

## The Third Howard Government: Initial appraisals and assessments

### Professor Tom Frame

There were very few extended treatments of the performance of the first two Howard Governments by either journalists or academics until late mid-2001.<sup>1</sup> Many commentators had long presumed the Coalition would probably lose the first election of the new millennium and measured retrospectives could be compiled when the Howard years had ended. All of the polls in 1999 and 2000 suggested an easy victory for the Kim Beazley-led Opposition at the next election. After the Liberal Party retained the seat of Aston in a July 2001 by-election and subsequent surveys showed support for Labor was ebbing, the Government's opponents beyond parliament found their voice and eager publishers willing to give critical views a wider audience.

The collective description of those producing articles and books as the Government's 'opponents' is intended to be neither an assertion nor an accusation. It was how a range of authors described themselves and their motivations for writing. They were self-declared opponents of John Howard and were antagonistic to his government and the things for which it stood. They wrote with a vehemence not seen during the previous five years. There was no pretence to even-handedness. These were partisan accounts published for overtly polemical purposes. Both the likely re-election of the Howard Government and the campaigning leading to its victory in November 2001 plainly prompted the change of mood. The possibility that the Coalition would secure a third term in office was highly unexpected and, to some writers, a devastating disappointment. Pursuing that success by appealing to racism and descending to populism was an indictment of both the candidates and the electorate although the latter was rarely chided for its poor judgement.

In October 2001 and with election campaigning underway, Guy Rundle, the co-editor of *Arena* magazine, published 'The Opportunist: John Howard and the Triumph of Reaction' in the *Quarterly Essay* series published by Black Inc. The back cover blurb praised Rundle's essay as

a brilliant account of John Howard's dominant ideas, his concerted 'dreaming' with its emphasis on unity and national identity that reveals him to be the most reactionary PM we have ever had, the only political leader who would allow ideas like those of One Nation to dominate the mainstream of Australian politics in order to improve his political chances.

The book was promoted as a 'plea for right-thinking people of every political persuasion to resist the call to

prejudice and reaction'. It went beyond reporting; it was commentary.

*The Opportunist* portrays Howard not as the 'ordinary man' but as a 'small man' who could not compete with the real 'common Aussie', Bob Hawke. Rundle contends that anyone could have won the 1996 election against a 'burnt-out and distracted' Paul Keating. Over the ensuing years Howard merely continued his predecessor's macroeconomic program while weakening the left-wing of his own party and dividing the nation. After five years in power and few achievements he could claim for his own, Rundle damned Howard for bringing 'his party to the point where only the bullying of a boatload of stateless people has allowed him the chance to remain in power'.<sup>2</sup> But as prime minister, Howard was willing to 'summon up the worst side of the Australian spirit, forcing your more scrupulous opponents into a position where sooner or later they cannot bear to match you blow-for-blow, and are revealed to the public as the anti-patriotic time-servers they were all along'.<sup>3</sup>

According to Rundle, Howard did not enjoy the loyalty or the affection of his colleagues – he was just a convenient figure for them to have around. Howard departed from the ideological foundations of his party when it suited him and damaged the political institutions for which he claimed to have respect. The twenty-fifth prime minister was not like his Australian Liberal predecessors, he was 'far more Nixonian – more distanced, as a politician, from his own personal political and moral beliefs – than either his opponents or supporters would like to imagine'. The prospect of more John Howard filled Rundle with loathing and despair because it would be achieved on the basis of irrational fears and blind prejudice of the kind he thought had long passed into memory. Perhaps worse, 'the Howard team had provided government that had pleased almost no one, except the CEOs of large businesses'.

In sum, according to Rundle, 'the Howard years have been a fidgety period – dissatisfying, irritating, exasperating. Living in the absence of any clear vision, except to go on and procrastinate, one feels that absence greatly, as the reverse of any vision'. John Howard's great achievement was 'the systematic lowering of others expectations, of establishing that there was less to things than met the eye'. To substantiate his claim, Rundle drew on the opinions of arguably the least well-placed person to comment on John Howard with any objectivity – Paul Keating. Rundle was drafting his critique of John Howard when the planes struck the buildings in New York and Washington. Again, he contended, Howard had turned a tragedy into a travesty by manipulating the outcome to his political advance. As the nation headed to the



polls on 10 November 2001 and irrespective of the result, John Howard's legacy was that 'he secured and cemented, he deepened and entrenched, so much of the worst, rather than the best, of the country he so haphazardly came to lead'.<sup>7</sup> Rundle left no one in any doubt as to his view. Gun control apart, Howard and his government had done nothing right and everything wrong for more than five years.

Just as Rundle's essay appeared in the bookshops, the La Trobe University academic, Professor Robert Manne, published a collection of newspaper articles and columns under the title, *The Barren Years: John Howard and Australian Political Culture*. Manne had already decided that Howard was the most destructive prime minister the nation had ever endured. Ignoring the historic and contemporary examples of Alfred Deakin and Malcolm Fraser, Howard looked to Menzies 'the most influential cultural conservative within the Australian liberal tradition'. He damned Howard for failing to present alternatives to multiculturalism, deepening links with Asia, an Australian republic and Aboriginal reconciliation. He chided the government for not supporting the universities and not esteeming the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (the ABC), two institutions he said were 'central to liberal civilisation in Australia'. Manne claimed that by the end of the second Howard Government, discussion of issues vital to the nation's future were 'affected by the souring of the public mood and the peculiar atmosphere created by right-wing newspaper columnists and radio-talk back hosts'. These were, of course, the people the prime minister had used to communicate with the Australian people. Manne also damned the Howard Government's approach to the Centenary of Australian Federation as being 'humourless, conventional and very dull'.

The first five years of the Howard government were simply 'the barren years', a time characterised by 'the closing of minds, the hardening of hearts'. No doubt looking at the imminent Federal election and the 'more likely than not' possibility that Labor would be governing nationally and in every state, he expressed his 'hope that before too long, with a change in national political leadership, a more liberal, generous and humane political culture will return'. Manne also predicted that One Nation preferences would 'deliver government to the ALP'. It was possible that these preferences might flow to the Coalition and create the environment that would make Tony Abbott 'the most plausible next leader of an administration increasingly reliant for its electoral fortunes on the good opinion of Senator Pauline Hanson and her team'. Given his strong views, Manne was very likely to write again if the Coalition were returned to power.

Shortly after the 2001 election, David Solomon invited six leading journalists to assess both the campaign and its immediate outcome for *Howard's Race: Winning the Unwinnable Election*. Three

contributors were from the Brisbane's *Courier Mail*, one each from Sydney's *Daily Telegraph* and the *Adelaide Advertiser*, and one was from News Limited's Canberra bureau. These were journalists writing for newspapers that were usually well disposed to the Coalition. Their brief was to explain why John Howard won the 'extraordinary' 2001 federal election. In their opening chapter, Peter Charlton and David Solomon contend that Labor lost because Beazley was 'unable to persuade voters to make their decision on the basis of domestic politics such as health, education and employment' while Howard won because 'he was able to campaign on leadership and border protection, mainly because in late August a Norwegian container ship rescued a boatload of asylum seekers and tried to land them on Christmas Island'.<sup>8</sup>

Malcolm Farr attributed the 2001 election victory to hard work and big spending. It was all the more notable because Howard was one of 'few leaders to survive the introduction of an indirect tax'.<sup>9</sup> Dennis Atkins thought that 'Beazley did not perform as well as many knew he could during the 1998-2001 period. His media discipline was not sharp enough'. This was apparently part of a wider malaise: 'the chaotic nature of much of Beazley's political style can be traced to his own lack of focus, something not even the disciplinarians Stephen Smith and John Faulkner could check during the campaign itself'.<sup>10</sup>

Indiscipline also led to signs the Australian Democrats were imploding. Phillip Coorey explained that by 2001 the Democrats had lost support from their members for allowing a modified GST to pass the Senate and then suffered from debilitating infighting that eventually delivered the party's leadership to Natasha Stott Despoja. While she was personally popular with a segment of the electorate, her emphasis on domestic policy and 'Change Politics' had little appeal with a public that was concerned about the influx of boatpeople and 'was in no mood to change anything'.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, Peter Charlton thought that Labor was mistaken about the electorate's general acceptance of the GST and the interest of voters in seeing it abolished. The GST was both less important and less unpopular with voters than Labor imagined. The tax had been efficiently introduced and did not constitute a reason, polls suggested, for changing the government.<sup>11</sup>

The most fulsome condemnation of the Coalition's campaign strategy was Peter Charlton's chapter, '*Tampa*: the triumph of politics', in which he accused Howard of seeing in the arrival of MV *Tampa* off Christmas Island 'a perfect opportunity to exhibit a clear policy difference between the Coalition and Labor, a difference that a ruthless and wily politician might be able to exploit'. He went on to allege that Howard used *Tampa* to 'wedge' the Opposition whose members professed a range of views reflecting a vastly different constituency on what was now being called 'border

protection'. While the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 might have overshadowed *Tampa*, they amplified the message.

The reality of the Coalition's political campaign is plain to see. It began with demonising people seeking refugee status in this country. It continued with harsh and oppressive conditions in detention centres. It thrived on media blackouts and selective briefings to friendly journalists.

Charlton contended that the Coalition had appealed to a hard-line, authoritarian, racist element in the community making the 2001 election a very low point in the nation's history. The government had appealed to the electorate's basest political sentiment and deserved censure. Just as reprehensible was the government's deliberate focus on the war in Afghanistan, which was not much more than a sideshow, and its appropriation of the Australian Defence Force and the nation's military heritage. The aim was to make John Howard look statesmanlike although more Defence assets were being used to stop the flow of refugees than had been deployed to the Middle East to overwhelm the Taliban.

The election campaign itself was, Malcolm Farr argued, focussed on Howard and his strength and steadiness as a leader in contrast to Kim Beazley who waffled and lacked resolve. The Coalition would depict Labor as a party unsure of its convictions and unreliable when it came to border protection and national security. Curiously, Beazley was judged to have done better in the televised debates but those polled said these contests would not make much difference to how they intended to vote. The Liberal campaign was, in Farr's judgement, 'disciplined and united' although there were two problematic areas. The first was Howard's response to questions about the future of Telstra and whether he would retire during the life of the next parliament and allow Peter Costello to succeed him. Costello had floated the possibility that the government might sell its majority stakeholding in Telstra which angered voters in regional and rural area. The rumoured succession was an easy target for Labor which had known from bitter experience that the Hawke-Keating succession tension was a powerful distraction from policy. Howard had said in July 2000 that he would consider his future when he turned 64. He was now 62. Farr thought it was noteworthy that 14 per cent of voters had not made up their minds when they left home to vote on 10 November 2001. The previous eight months of intense political drama had not made much difference. Farr concluded: 'this tardiness leaves professional campaign organisers, those in charge of attracting the attention of voters, shaking their heads in distress'.<sup>13</sup> The imputation was that emotion influenced the election outcome and, as usual, a good measure of self-interest as well.

Dennis Atkins claimed the Opposition's campaign was thrown into disarray by 'September 11' and that

it never recovered the initiative. *Tampa* had seen the momentum drift towards the government and 9/11 confirmed it. The electorate forgot the government had been labelled 'mean and tricky' by one of its own supporters and that ten months ago it was trailing heavily in the polls. Although its domestic performance had not improved and everyday problems remained, Atkins observed that Labor was unable to remind voters of what they appeared to dislike about Howard and the Coalition not that long ago. A campaign to scare the electorate into thinking the Coalition would increase the GST and include food made little real difference. Labor campaign strategists, including former New South Wales Premier Neville Wran, said Beazley was still an unknown quantity in the eastern states and he had failed to capture the popular imagination. He was seen as a good man but lacking drive and determination. Atkins ended his chapter by explaining that the character of Labor's loss in 2001 would make it difficult for Labor to win in 2004. Party officials had apparently started some polling on Beazley's likely replacement, Simon Crean, before the loss and noted the new leader 'had some serious image problems, especially among women. But senior campaign workers believe Crean's problems are mostly superficial and can be addressed'.<sup>14</sup> Atkins was told by his Labor sources:

[Crean] needs to demonstrate that he can kill his own, like [British Labour leader Tony] Blair did. The mob love it when you kill your own. Crean can do it by being tough and consultative. Watch him and watch two others – Blair and [Queensland Premier Peter] Beattie. If Crean can adopt some of the style and substance of Blair and Beattie he's got a fighting chance.<sup>15</sup>

The 2001 election meant different things to the National Party, explained Christine Jackman. The Nationals leader and Deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson, had campaigned strongly and was credited with regaining much of the electoral ground seized by One Nation in 1998. Anderson had been faced with rural and regional community anger over the uncertain fate of Telstra and the implications of Ansett Airlines' collapse in September. While Jackman admired Anderson's total commitment to the campaign, she noted that the Nationals had lost seats to the Liberals and to independents and that its standing in parliament and in the cabinet had not improved. The Liberals now had twice as many regional and rural seats as the Nationals whose lower house parliamentary representation was nearly half of its 1984 peak of 21. The main consequence of the 2001 election for the Nationals were calls for the renewal of its party organisation, the professionalism of its administration and financing, and the overhaul of its campaigning. The main issue identified by Anderson and his deputy Mark Vaile was the need for the federal organisation to have a greater role in selecting candidates. She felt that 'a more pressing question is whether the Liberal



Party will continue to find room for the Nationals in the Coalition, should the disproportion between the two parties' seat count continue to grow'.<sup>16</sup>

The three chapters dealing with the other players in the 2001 election could virtually be summarised in one sentence: the Australian Democrats led by Natasha Stott Despoja did poorly, the Greens led by Bob Brown gained ground, the Independents (Bob Katter, Peter Andren and Tony Windsor) did well and One Nation ebbed towards obscurity although Pauline Hanson personally outpolled the Nationals' stalwart Ron Boswell.

The final chapter, 'Election race or race election?', relied heavily on the views of former Liberal leader John Hewson who wondered in an opinion piece published eight days before the election whether the result would be a victory of prejudice over policy. Hewson accused Howard of exploiting *Tampa*, playing the race card and lacking a 'genuine passion for policy'. The collection's editor, David Solomon, quoted the conservative English magazine, *The Economist*, which damned the Coalition for failing to embrace multiculturalism and promoting xenophobia. To show balance, he also quoted Lynton Crosby's election post-mortem at the National Press Club in which the Party's Federal Director complained that 'many commentators are falling for the ALP's line that our victory was due only to the MV *Tampa* and the issue of illegal migrants. This is wrong. It denies the Government's position in successive opinion polls prior to the *Tampa*'. Crosby said that *Tampa* had only a reinforcing effect in the minds of voters who had already noted the differences between the two parties. Solomon was unconvinced: Tampa was the definitive event of the campaign because it made immigration a key issue upon which voters would need to exercise a choice. He cited polling that showed 10 per cent of those who voted for the Coalition did so because of its stand on boatpeople. He thought the Coalition had bought its way out of electoral difficulty with policies that could be characterised as either sensible or opportunistic, depending on whether the observer was a beneficiary.

As a consequence of the election, John Howard was returned to power and would probably become the second longest serving prime minister, surpassing Bob Hawke and Malcolm Fraser during the life of the new parliament, unless he retired to give Peter Costello some time to consolidate his position before the next poll expected in 2004. Kim Beazley sent himself to the backbench and, as expected, Simon Crean was elected Labor leader unopposed. The new parliament saw some new faces in Cabinet, such as Kay Patterson and Brendan Nelson, and on the Labor front bench, such as Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard. The Government would turn its attention to industrial relations and its unfulfilled agenda and Labor would re-examine its position on a number of contentious issues. In sum, Solomon was deeply unimpressed by the election.

There were

relatively few domestic policy initiatives announced by the Coalition during the campaign. There were no particular legislative proposals for which it could reasonably claim to have a mandate. It will face a Senate where the minor parties are likely to compete in their hostility towards its policies. This is the legacy of an election fought primarily on an issue of little material relevance to Australia's development as a nation.

By mid-2003, the Howard Government's opponents were focussing their attacks on the Coalition's credibility especially after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq had not uncovered any weapons of mass destruction (WMD). An example was Andrew Pegler's *John Howard's Little Book of Truth*.<sup>17</sup> This attempt at a satirical work contained brief commentaries, quotes and cartoons. The author was assisted by 'resources' from a number of websites and the office of Michael Danby, the Federal Labor member for Melbourne Ports. Pegler described himself as a 'plain English editor' who worked with organisations in need of clear prose. His political affiliations were not disclosed and the reader is not given any insight into his competence to comment as a political commentator. Pegler's approach was to compare and contrast what appeared to be inconsistent and conflicting public statements to demonstrate that Howard and his ministers were self-interested liars who were bereft of any integrity. The tone is intentionally ironic and deliberately insulting. It begins with Howard's declaration: 'My government will always seek to be truthful and open with the Australian public'; and ends with the prime minister's lament: 'Increasingly honesty is being swamped by cynical election campaigns based on fear, or the big scare, or the massive lie'. The intervening chapters interpret the events of the previous few years through the lens of contested truthfulness: the 'children overboard' affair, the introduction of the GST, the war in Iraq, the sinking of Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) X, and ministerial misconduct. Many of the cartoons are sexually crude and personally offensive. The cover depicts John Howard with a 'Pinocchio nose' dangling from strings giving the impression that he is a puppet being manipulated by unseen actors.

In the second half of 2003, two books appeared critiquing the Howard Government's immigration and border protection policies. In March of that year, David Marr and Marian Wilkinson published *Dark Victory*, a work they described as

the secret history of John Howard's campaign against boat people that began with the Tampa and ended ten weeks later – after deaths and disappearances, violent confrontations in the Indian Ocean and international uproar – with the Australian people giving the (Prime Minister) his third, most daring election victory.

The people of Australia were not blamed for casting their votes as they did; Howard was condemned for the manner in which he secured them.

Marr and Wilkinson were critical of an overly compliant public service, an Opposition fearful of the electorate, political naivety among senior Defence Force officers and the manoeuvring of spin-doctors. The back cover blurb accused the Howard Government of very serious crimes.

They put lives at risk. They twisted the law.  
They drew the military into the heart of an election campaign. They muzzled the press.  
They misused intelligence services, defied the United Nations, antagonised Indonesia and bribed poverty stricken Pacific states. They closed Australia to refugees – and won a mighty election victory.

In November 2003, Father Frank Brennan published *Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem* and contended that 'the arrival of the Tampa was an event waiting 25 years to happen'. Brennan distinguished himself from other refugee advocates in acknowledging 'the very difficult challenges that confront governments in this field ... Not everyone who crosses a border uninvited and claims asylum is a refugee ... Governments running an orderly migration program are entitled to insist on measures to facilitate their removal'.<sup>18</sup> Brennan's critique was much less polemical but no less pointed: the Howard Government had acted in a manner contrary to international convention, that it had damaged Australia's international reputation, the obligations Australia had accepted by signing covenants had been ignored and the nation's borders had been closed to vulnerable people entitled to seek relief from oppression and tyranny. He characterised Australia's response to the arrival of *Tampa* specifically and the presence of boat people generally as a massive over-reaction with far too much invested in so small a problem, by world standards. While Brennan's assessment was careful to avoid the political partisanship of most other works appearing at that time, he left readers in no doubt that he deplored the Howard Government's immigration policies and despaired of its attempts to turn asylum seekers into campaign fodder.

As the *Tampa* controversy continued to attract the attention of commentators, Australian participation in the invasion of Iraq provided the impetus for renewed criticism of the Howard Government. As one of three nations to commit forces to an operation that did not have explicit United Nations' sanction, the failure to detect the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were the basis for a pre-emptive strike that involved the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia demanded an explanation. Alison Broinowski's *Howard's War* appeared in August 2003, five months after the invasion. She claimed that it was 'perhaps the worst-justified war in Australia's history, not only because it was against Australia's interests, but

because the reasons given for it were false. It was, first and last, Howard's War'. Writing before the Iraqi insurgency gained momentum and thinking the war had been 'won', Broinowski was critical of the Coalition and John Howard in particular for making Australia 'a target for further terrorism', fracturing Australia's relations with regional neighbours and diminishing the international standing of the United Nations. She accused the prime minister of not revealing his 'real reasons' for committing Australia to war in Iraq and for failing to accept responsibility for the damage inflicted on Iraq after no WMD were found. She concluded that Australia went to war because the United States did and, in so doing, John Howard had sought President George W Bush's approbation and left Australia's foreign policy looking 'indistinguishable' from the United States.

Three months after Broinowski's book appeared, Raimond Gaita published a collection of essays with the title *Why the War was Wrong* with contributors well known for their hostility towards the Coalition including Robert Manne, Guy Rundle and Mark McKenna.<sup>19</sup> Writing in September 2003, Gaita thought it was 'still too early to know with what mixture of innocent ignorance, culpable ignorance, self-deception, distortion of intelligence documents and outright lies the leaders of the [military] coalition presented their case'.<sup>20</sup> His introduction was deliberately personal in attacking John Howard for mendacity, contempt for the electorate, hubris and for being 'intoxicated by the prestige of his friendship with the president of the world's only superpower'.<sup>21</sup> The contributors conclude that the invasion was unjust and unlawful; that the lives of Iraqi civilians were devalued and the norms of international diplomacy were ignored; that the enormous death toll could not and did not offset whatever strategic and security gains were ever on offer. John Howard was accused of rewriting history when he claimed the invasion liberated the Iraqi people from a dictator as if that had been the reason for deploying Australian troops when he insisted before the invasion that the possession and potential use of WMD was the only reason for commencing hostilities with Iraq. One of the contributors, the moral philosopher Peter Coghlan, called on Howard and his Government to resign.<sup>22</sup> Mark McKenna castigated Howard for promoting and participating in 'welcome home' parades for Australian military personnel, 'generally basking in the reflected glow of the diggers' glory' in the hope of securing domestic political capital. These parades 'became a means of eradicating criticism of the Iraq war, marginalising political opposition and drafting the country to vote for the diggers' mate – John Howard'.<sup>23</sup> His attacks on Howard were scathing and personal. This collection would have been enriched by a contribution from an observer known to be sympathetic to John Howard but able to decipher mixed messages on Iraq and to make judgements about Howard and the Coalition that would not be readily dismissed as routine political dissent.

There is no attempt to explain or to understand what the Government tried to do and why; the overarching aim is to criticise and condemn. The final summing-up included judgements on the political efficacy and the moral character of the actions taken by the government. There are many objections that could be made to both works from a philosophical and political perspective. But these authors do not seem to acknowledge that another view is possible or even valid while there is the assumption by the contributors of a higher moral ground that effectively relegates any criticisms to the realm of literary pettiness or amoral pragmatism. I, too, believe the decision to invade Iraq was deeply flawed and led to enormous human suffering. The subsequent occupation led to enduring instability within Iraq and in neighbouring countries (most notably from Turkey to Syria) apart from the enmity that was felt towards Australia in nations that were previously well disposed. But it is simplistic to contend that John Howard authorised the invasion because he courted personal favour with President Bush and mistaken to assert he was able to persuade the substantial defence and security machinery of the Commonwealth Government to oblige his whims. Responsibility for the invasion of Iraq and the mismanagement of the aftermath does rest with John Howard and those who shared in the burden of decision-making. Accountability for the advice and the assessments that supported Australia's decision to join a coalition with the United States and the United Kingdom for the invasion of Iraq needed to be distributed very broadly as the 2004 report by former diplomat and intelligence chief Philip Flood made clear.<sup>24</sup>

As expected, Robert Manne loudly lamented the re-election of the Howard Government in 2001 and had no reason to change his mind when editing a collection of essays critical of the Howard Government twelve months into its third term. Becoming acquainted with the work of 'intellectuals, academics and journalists who have been able to give voice to this growing sense of unease', Manne invited them to analyse 'with rigour and depth, the moral and policy failures of the Howard Government in the areas of their particular expertise'. The resulting volume, *The Howard Years*, included chapters by Judith Brett, Mick Dodson, Julian Disney, Ian Lowe and Tony Kevin. The contributors were associated in different ways with the opposition parties or movements while Brett's academic writings were characteristically critical of the Liberal Party. They intended to show how the 'most conservative leader the Liberal Party has ever had, has re-made and divided the nation'.

Promoted as 'an indispensable first reckoning with what the Howard years have meant for Australia', Manne's preface claimed that 'a sizable minority' of Australians believed that the Howard Government was 'the most backward-looking and mean-spirited government of Australia's post-war years'. He had

encountered 'considerable numbers of people at large public meetings who are both disturbed and perplexed by the ruthless and unprincipled behaviour of their country's government'. Manne conceded that many Australians approved of the prime minister and supported his Government's policies. They were, as the election result had shown, in the majority. Were they deluded by Howard's deceitful public pronouncements? Were they denying he had done anything wrong or were they dutifully acknowledging the man responsible for increasing their personal affluence at the expense of the common good? What did Manne have to say about the misled majority?

After noting with some surprise that this collection was 'strangely enough, the first reasonably systematic and broad-ranging assessment of the impact on Australia of the Howard years', he hoped that it would help 'supporters of the Howard government who wish to learn more about the nature of some of their fellow citizens' criticisms'. Acquainted with evidence of Howard's lies and the Coalition's treachery but aided by Manne's purportedly apolitical commentary, they would abandon the Coalition. Although the essays were uniformly critical of the Howard Government and urged the rejection of the Coalition at the next poll, Manne assured his readers there was 'no party line' to be found in the pages of his book. While assessments of this kind usually include positive and negative appraisals with credit given where it was due, Manne was critical of virtually every aspect of the Government's performance.

Reaching back to the election that brought the Coalition to power, Manne thought the Liberal Opposition conspired with the Labor Government to keep the 1996 budget deficit a secret because it 'did not wish to disclose to the public before the election the cuts in public expenditure which a projected budget deficit would necessitate'.<sup>25</sup> In effect, the budget 'black hole' was exploited to wage an ideological war on the universities, the ABC, the Australian Public Service and a number of troublesome federal agencies including the Office of Multicultural Affairs and the Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Commission. He was damning of the government for the extent of its privatisation program because assets were being liquidated to cover liabilities. He left history to judge whether the government debt reduction strategy and labour market deregulation were good things.

Manne claimed that the first Howard Government oscillated between the zealotry that had been John Hewson's downfall and the timidity that had led to the so-called 'Seven Wasted Years' of the Fraser Government. Manne noted that the government's supporters were disappointed and cited Paul Kelly's article 'Howard's Report Card: A Year of Governing Cautiously' as a yardstick of the Coalition's performance. Manne linked the Prime Minister being 'stung' by this criticism to the origins of the waterfront dispute and the decision to introduce a consumption



tax. Manne interprets both as response to criticisms of 1997. He remarked: 'no-one could any longer doubt Howard's political courage. No-one need any longer fear that he would go down in history as a do-nothing prime minister'.<sup>26</sup> But, he concluded, 'the future of Australian politics belonged to the leader who could best attract globalisation's 'losers' without alienating the support of those for whom the new economy and society 'worked'. He went on to chastise Howard's response to Pauline Hanson (journalist Malcolm Farr thought 'Hansonism' was Keating's creation) noting that one in four Queenslanders had voted for her new party One Nation at the June 1998 state election.<sup>27</sup> His more strident criticisms were not focussed on the first Howard Government but on the second.

The Coalition managed to undermine the momentum that had been gathering for Aboriginal reconciliation through its less than fulsome response to the *Bringing them Home* report, mainly the Government's refusal to make a formal apology, and its resistance to several key elements of a formal Declaration being prepared by the Reconciliation Council to be presented to the Government on the centenary of Australian Federation – 1 January 2001. The Government had also demonised asylum seekers and shunned its responsibilities for their humane treatment under international law. Among those the Government branded 'the elites', opposition to the manner in which asylum seekers were being treated had turned into outrage. They believed the government was behaving 'with a level of cruelty and indifference they had once assumed no Australian government ever would. John Howard's Australia was becoming unrecognisable to them'.<sup>28</sup> They were the central pillars in 'Howard's cultural 'rollback' campaign'.<sup>29</sup>

As the Coalition's electoral fortunes continued to plummet in 2001, the Government started to pacify those who were angered by its policies and to assuage those whose personal circumstances were adversely affected by global trends for which the Government was not to blame. Manne remarked: 'in the history of Australian pork-barrelling there have never been so many barrels of so many varieties of pork'.<sup>30</sup> Worse still was its self-serving handling of the *Tampa* controversy. The Government 'manufactured [an] atmosphere of panic' and manage to 'wedge' the Labor Party, alleging it was soft on border protection. Australia's long-term standing as a humanitarian nation was abandoned for the sake of short-term electoral advantage. The 'children overboard' affair was further confirmation of the Government's decadence. Did these events influence the election result? Manne concluded there was 'no serious doubt' that they did.

These events had a large significance according to Manne:

A transition from old-style Australian liberalism to a kind of conservative populism was implicit in Howard's cultural agenda. With *Tampa* it

became explicit. Not only did Howard create a new kind of Liberal Party; a different kind of political culture had been born.<sup>31</sup>

But, Manne noted, Howard had not replaced the Keating vision he had manage to bury. That, claimed Manne, would emerge 'in his third term'.

Ahead of the 2004 Federal election and intended to influence its outcome, former Fairfax journalist Margo Kingston published *Not Happy John!* [A companion volume *Still Not Happy John!* was published in 2007.] Kingston's book was launched by former Federal Court judge and corruption royal commissioner, Tony Fitzgerald QC, and created the impetus for the 'Not happy, John' campaign in the Prime Minister's seat of Bennelong. Based on her web diary hosted initially on the Fairfax website, Kingston accused the Coalition Government of being authoritarian and manipulative, secretive and closed, indifferent to the rule of law and unconcerned with the dignity of parliament. Kingston acknowledged her partisan approach in the introduction. She also made a point of personalising her complaints: John Howard was to blame. His ministers were mere accomplices.

This book contends that John Howard is not a liberal, or a Liberal, or a conservative, or a Conservative. It seeks to show that he's part of an ideological wrecking gang made up of radical-populist economic opportunists, one which long ago decided that robust liberal democracy was an impediment to the real elites – Big Business and Big Media – that sponsor them, rather than an essential complement to and underwriter of market capitalism.<sup>32</sup>

A few pages later she includes the Labor Opposition in a general indictment of political parties for their role in the slow destruction of Australia's democratic system and a looming crisis in government. She reminded her readers that it was Labor's decision to fund election campaigns in 1983 that had shifted the emphasis within political parties from members to money and from policies to fundraising.

Occasional contributors to her web diary also produced several chapters. Kingston and her collaborators argued that members of the media and the public service were complicit in the erosion of civil liberties and what they consider common decency. Kingston's commentary is characterised by raw indignation. Her opinions burst with anger. Unable to find anything positive about the Coalition's performance, she condemns the Howard Government and anyone not critical of its conduct. The book ended with a call to concerned Australians for greater community involvement in politics because John Howard had treated the electorate as 'passive consumers' and not citizens.

These extended treatments of the Howard Government published between October 2001 and August 2004 interpreted policies and decisions to show the Coalition's perfidy and mendacity, the poverty of its ideas and the perversity of its campaigning. These commentators evidently believed the electorate needed to be 'schooled' in why the Howard Government was so unworthy of power, why it should be ejected from office and why it deserved to be condemned by every right thinking person. It was not clear whether the Coalition promoted the base attitudes detested by these observers or merely provided an opportunity for their expression. The emphasis in these works was less on explaining why the Government may have felt obliged to take certain actions and more on imputing the worst of all possible motives to the Coalition. Condemning Howard and his ministers is the obvious priority and there were no mitigating circumstances.

Most attention was focussed on two areas of policy – immigration and national security. Virtually every other area of public administration was ignored. The nation's economic and trade performance, investment in infrastructure and the continuing reform of firearms legislation counted for nothing. These authors engaged in little more than special pleading inasmuch as they

refused to consider reasonable contrary views. There were no discordant voices in Manne's collection. Either they couldn't be found or he regarded their views as unworthy of inclusion in a collection bearing his name. Manne and others simply confirmed the opinions of those who already disdained the Howard Government while the majority of the electorate remained entirely open to the possibility of re-electing the Coalition at the next poll. Members of the public apparently thought the Howard Government met many of their expectations and fulfilled quite a few of their aspirations. This was not the utterly despicable government that Manne, Rundle and Kingston considered it to be. It is doubtful whether their work made any difference to popular thinking or changed voters' minds. Despite accusing these commentators of being biased at worst and jaundiced at best, the Coalition's supporters and those who could see the Howard Government's strengths as well as its weaknesses were surprisingly mute. It would not be until the tenth anniversary of the Howard Government's election in 1996 that the first counter-collection of essays would appear. If the Howard Government was interested in propaganda and stifling debate, it did a very poor job of containing its adversaries and encouraging its advocates.





- <sup>1</sup> The collection edited by Chris Aulich and Roger Wettenhall, *Howard's Second and Third Governments*, was reviewed in the previous conference booklet and in my appendix to the *Back from the Brink, 1998-2001: the Howard Government Volume II* published by UNSW Press and released to coincide with this conference. It is a serious scholarly work with the greatest claim to impartiality and even-handedness.
- <sup>2</sup> Guy Rundle, *The Opportunist*, p. 12.
- <sup>3</sup> Rundle, *The Opportunist*, p. 8.
- <sup>4</sup> Rundle, *The Opportunist*, p. 13.
- <sup>5</sup> Rundle, *The Opportunist*, p. 54.
- <sup>6</sup> Rundle, *The Opportunist*, p. 54.
- <sup>7</sup> Rundle, *The Opportunist*, p. 62.
- <sup>8</sup> David Solomon, *Howard's Race: Winning the Unwinnable Election*, p. 7.
- <sup>9</sup> Malcolm Farr in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 20.
- <sup>10</sup> Atkins in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 31.
- <sup>11</sup> Coorey in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 49.
- <sup>12</sup> Peter Charlton in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 78.
- <sup>13</sup> Farr in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 143.
- <sup>14</sup> Atkins in in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 156.
- <sup>15</sup> Atkins in in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 156.
- <sup>16</sup> Christine Jackman in Atkins in in Solomon, *Howard's Race*, p. 173.
- <sup>17</sup> Andrew Pegler, *John Howard's Little Book of Truth*, Hardie Grant Books, 2003.
- <sup>18</sup> Frank Brennan, *Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem*, p. ix.
- <sup>19</sup> Raimond Gaita, *Why the War was Wrong*,
- <sup>20</sup> Gaita, *Why the War was Wrong*, p. 1.
- <sup>21</sup> Gaita, *Why the War was Wrong*, p. 7.
- <sup>22</sup> Gaita, *Why the War was Wrong*, p. 115.
- <sup>23</sup> Gaita, *Why the War was Wrong*, p. 183.
- <sup>24</sup> <https://fas.org/irp/world/australia/flood.pdf>
- <sup>25</sup> Robert Manne (ed.), *The Howard Years*, p. 8.
- <sup>26</sup> Manne, *The Howard Years*, p. 21.
- <sup>27</sup> Manne, *The Howard Years*, p. 21.
- <sup>28</sup> Manne, *The Howard Years*, p. 35.
- <sup>29</sup> Manne, *The Howard Years*, p. 37.
- <sup>30</sup> Manne, *The Howard Years*, p. 37.
- <sup>31</sup> Manne, *The Howard Years*, p. 44.
- <sup>32</sup> Margot Kingston, *Not Happy John!*, Penguin, Sydney, 2004, p. 5.

# Howard Government Retrospective III: 2001-2004

## Venue - Old Parliament House



 18 King George Terrace, Parkes ACT 2600

## Notes

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
# Book Launch

## Back from the Brink, 1997-2001: The Howard Government

**Date:** Tuesday 4 December 2018  
**Time:** 5.00pm – 6.30pm (including refreshments)  
**Venue:** Members' Dining Room 2  
Provisional (Old) Parliament House  
18 King George Terrace, Parkes (please enter from rear of building)  
**RSVP:** 27 November 2018

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**Contact:** Ms Holly Steer, Events Coordinator, Office of the Rector  
m: 0466 562 533 | e: [h.steer@adfa.edu.au](mailto:h.steer@adfa.edu.au)





## Contact Us

If you would like further information, please contact:

### Public Leadership Research Group (PLRG)

Andrew Blyth, Group Manager, PLRG-Howard Library

Telephone: 0466 402 415

Email: [a.blyth@adfa.edu.au](mailto:a.blyth@adfa.edu.au)



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